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Abstract 
Forgiveness is one possible response by a 'victim' to a specific act of wrongdoing, especially when the 'wrongdoer' 
apologises and invites joint condemnation of the act ("I'm sorry, that was really stupid of me"), perhaps explaining 
the source of misjudgement or ignorance that brought it about. In this paper, however, I will ask what the victim can 
do when faced with an unrepentant wrongdoer, perhaps some-one who even refuses to acknowledge that a wrong 
act was committed or that the victim 'really' suffered ("stop complaining, I didn't hurt you!"). Importantly, I will ask 
if it is possible to forgive some-one just for being who they are - for example, estranged parents - without 
necessarily implying an attempt to resume a broken relationship. This will involve a conceptual analysis of the term 
as used in the situation, in parallel to a phenomenological analysis of how the victim is to come to see the wrongdoer 
and her act in order to forgive her. My account will stress two aspects of the 'wrongdoing situation' in order to 
relocate the problem rather than attempt to solve it - first, the wrongdoer's unique narrative history, and the more or 
less intelligible role played by the wrong act within such a self-understanding; second, the fundamental uncertainty 
of motive that lies at the heart of all human action and thus impedes one's ability to ever fully understand a wrong 





Michael Frayn's 1998 play Copenhagen describes the relationship between two atomic 
physicists, the Dane Niels Bohr and the German Werner Heisenberg. They first met in the 1920s 
and became close friends. The Second World War and the occupation of Denmark separated the 
two men not only geographically but ideologically as well. They met briefly when Heisenberg 
visited Copenhagen in 1941, and then again in 1947, but this marked the definite end of the 
relationship. As Frayn and other biographers have revealed, the relationship was a complicated 
one, and it would be simplistic to say simply that Heisenberg was seeking to renew their 
closeness on his two visits and that Bohr chose to rebuff him. What is certain, however, is that 
Bohr was indignant about Heisenberg's support for Nazi Germany and especially for the German 
atomic weaponry programme, and hurt by his implied attitudes to Bohr as a Dane and half-Jew. 
At some stage, then, Bohr must have undergone an extensive thought process about whether and 
how to forgive his former friend.  
It is this thought process I wish to examine in this essay, and if possible to find some general 
conclusions about the nature of forgiveness and the conceptual difficulties involved. My 
approach will differ from most accounts of forgiveness in three important ways: 
1. I will not be interested in an isolated act of direct wrongdoing against the victim, an act 
for which the wrongdoer may then apologise to and beg forgiveness from the victim; 
rather, I will be interested in a hurtful attitude – perhaps as manifest in a series of 
representative acts – maintained through time, within a context of the wrongdoer’s 
concrete life history and set of projects and commitments extending into the future. 
2. Heisenberg's attitude is not aimed at Bohr, and his hurting Bohr is not directly intended, 
but an indirectly intended 'double-effect' (to some extent foreseen) of his allegiance to a 
separate and incompatible value. 
3. For whatever reason (about which I shall speculate near the end of this paper), 
Heisenberg is unrepentant, even after the war. There is no invitation to a joint 
condemnation of what is to be henceforth deemed a wrong but aberrant act, nor any 
desire to renew a (modified) friendship. Such joint condemnation and attempt at 
reconciliation are often considered necessary conditions for forgiveness (e.g. by Haber, 
Murphy and Roberts). In my chosen example, however, any protracted decision-making 
on Bohr's part about whether and how to forgive will be strictly unilateral, as if 
Heisenberg had effectively died. It would involve somehow accepting the sort of person 
Heisenberg was at heart, in the sense of his settled dispositions, preferences, 
commitments and self-understanding, rather than on the basis of what either of the two 
men desired him to become. 
As should now be clear, therefore, the purpose of this essay will not be to develop a 
comprehensive search for necessary and sufficient conditions for the objective ascription of the 
concept, as if by an idealised third party observer, and corresponding as closely as possible to our 
intuitions in the different cases. Rather, I will be more interested in the men’s particular points of 
view, each of himself and of the other, and as such my goal will be more to relocate the 
conceptual problem, and especially to reveal some of the systemic uncertainty that is endemic at 
every level of the participants' thinking. (2) 
A mutual friend of the two men, like Bohr's wife Margrethe (the third character in Frayn’s play), 
might approach Bohr after the war with the suggestion that Bohr 'ought' to forgive him and 
reconcile himself with him, or that Heisenberg 'deserves' it, and Margrethe might offer different 
sorts of reasons: "for old time's sake," for the mutual professional and private advantages of 
future co-operation, or simply on compassionate grounds e.g. because Heisenberg has already 
suffered enough (through international academic ostracism, not to mention the destruction of 
much of what he valued) for his misguided political views. Importantly, she might also attempt 
to excuse (that he wasn't himself) (3) or justify (that he was thus better placed to sabotage the 
atomic programme) his continued allegiance to Germany. However, Bohr could have replied that 
such 'deserved' or obligatory forgiveness would lose its essential gift-giving, elective status; all 
the more so since Margrethe's reasons are instrumental, overlooking the hurt rather than 
forgiving Heisenberg for the hurt. All the work would have been done by Heisenberg in such a 
case, and any ensuing forgiveness would be either too easy or merely superfluous.  
Alternatively, Margrethe might tell Bohr to reject all thoughts of forgiveness: former friend or 
not, the man supported a clearly evil regime throughout the war, indirectly supported the 
occupation of Denmark, hurting you in the process, and has shown no indications of contrition; 
your forgiveness will amount to no more than unjust condonation of his misdeeds and an abject 
lack of self-respect. 
Kolnai's logical paradoxy of forgiveness  
Bohr's type of conflict is well captured by Cheshire Calhoun, to whom we shall be returning at 
length. For the moment this conflict should be carefully but usefully distinguished from the 
paradoxy [sic] of forgiveness described by Aurel Kolnai. Kolnai takes the example of the 
repentant wrongdoer to generate one side of the paradox: 
"Suppose [the wrongdoer] has clearly undergone a change of heart. He has revoked and 
disavowed the offence in point and effected a rupture with his past in the given context' 
he has credibly 'mended his ways', apologised in a manner unmistakably manifesting or 
firmly presaging such a turn, in an appropriate case has made restitution, and so on. [...] 
Forgiveness has now lost its raison d'être: there is no room for it, seeing that there is 
nothing to be forgiven." (Kolnai 1973, p. 98, italics original) 
However, says Kolnai, forgiveness might also entail a risk of (i) condonation of the wrong act 
and (ii) self-denigration in the face of a clearly insulting message about the victim's perceived 
relative worth; both such entailments would be wrong. The paradoxy, says Kolnai, is that 
"forgiveness is either unjustified or pointless" (99).  
Now, like Kolnai's victim, Bohr's conflict does not involve the justice of acknowledging excuses 
and justifications, since they have already been factored into the description before Heisenberg's 
attitude is perceived as wrong and hurtful. Importantly, however, Bohr's conflict does not 
involve Kolnai's 'pointlessness' of forgiveness after genuine repentance, since Heisenberg, we 
have said, is effectively unrepentant and estranged. However, Kolnai's warning about the risk of 
forgiveness entailing self-denigration and an acquiescence in evil are certainly one side of Bohr's 
conflict. On the other, we may ask what the point would be of forgiving the unrepentant 
Heisenberg, beyond overcoming the corrosive resentment that Bohr might justifiably feel toward 
him (4). In trying to answer these questions, I shall only go part-way toward a full conceptual 
analysis, whereupon I prefer to rely more on a phenomenological account. This will be an 
account of how Bohr must come to see Heisenberg in order to forgive him, and come to 
understand Heisenberg's attempts to make sense of his ostensibly wrong attitudes within the 
context of his (Heisenberg's) own ‘maximally-integrated narrative history’. Importantly, 
Heisenberg as a choice-making person will not be directly involved in this phenomenological 
process of forgiveness, even though his attempts to conceive of his own life will be essential to 
the process. 
My approach may also be usefully contrasted with two other ‘unilateral’ views, the first being 
that of Bishop Butler. Butler's account is very subtle and I cannot do it justice here, but one of his 
claims is that forgiveness could be unilateral, and indeed, need be nothing more than the 
forswearing of resentment on religious or moral grounds. The status of the wrongdoer is taken 
into account qua fellow-child of God (5), but the determinate, particular nature of the wrongdoer 
and her act (note the emphasis), perhaps even including her possible repentance, does not seem 
to be directly relevant. I will agree that many forms of forgiveness do not require the 
wrongdoer's participation or interest, but I do not believe that the priority given to mere group 
membership can yield a sufficiently 'full-blooded' (Calhoun's term) forgiveness for those of us 
without the lonely destiny of a Socrates or Jesus or Nietzsche, whose self-respect is not grounded 
in the regard of other people. 
The second type of unilateral forgiveness could be merely instrumental. Indeed, some see 
forgiveness as essentially instrumental (6), deriving its value – to those with the forgiving 
disposition, as well as to those forgiven and to society in general by maintaining smooth 
cohesive relations – from certain qualities or facts that follow, or tend to follow, from the 
widespread act of forgiveness. I do not believe, however, that this accords with how we actually 
use the concept, in the same way that utilitarianism has a hard time accounting for our use of 
concepts such as altruism and integrity (7). An attenuated form of forgiveness, if cultivated as a 
disposition, will obviously have instrumental utility in easing complicated relationships, but then 
it will again cease to be ‘full-blooded’. Let me therefore postpone this point until we reach 
Calhoun’s discussion below. 
Distinction from some cognate concepts (8). 
To continue this initial analysis, I propose distinguishing forgiveness from other similar 
concepts. First, however, we need to understand some of the conceptual presuppositions of these 
concepts, and to adumbrate just how my account will differ in the assumptions it will have to 
make. Typically, an act of wrongdoing, committed knowingly, freely and deliberately by an 
agent, gives the victim an entitlement to resent that agent for the act itself as well as for the 
implied demeaning message accompanying the act. These three psychologically inter-related 
adverbs (‘knowingly’, ‘freely‘ and ‘deliberately’) are crucial to my account, since I aim to 
question the idealised rationality they presuppose. As a starting point, let me put forward the 
following claims, which concern the way the putative wrongdoer sees herself, her own 
biographical history, and her developing relationships with those around her: 
1. The Platonic claim. Starting with the idea that evil results only from ignorance of the 
good, I claim that putative wrongdoers are never completely aware that they are doing 
wrong and of the full extent and quality of the bad consequences of their wrong act. 
Much of this awareness is essentially psychological: the only way to generate the 
necessary confidence to commit an act which, upon impartial reflection and with 
maximal objectivity will appear wrong, is to have recourse to some temporary 
redescription of the act whereby it becomes excused or justified in the wrongdoer’s own 
terms and perspective at the moment of commission. Notice that the Platonic claim is not 
normative: the wrongdoer may still be equally blameworthy for having neglected to make 
sufficient effort to become relevantly aware. 
2. The Kantian claim: putative wrongdoers are never completely free (in the sense of being 
sufficiently informed of one’s causal relationship with one’s environment) to choose to 
do wrong, and cannot therefore fully intend to do wrong, since intention logically 
requires freedom and knowledge. As such we cannot conceive of a rational person 
deciding to choose a recognised evil. This claim is mutually dependent on the Platonic 
claim, in the non-viciously circular way many discussions of rationality become. 
Now the Kantian claim is perhaps more plausible than the Platonic claim, but I do not plan to 
argue for either at this point. I shall return to both claims later on, if only to support the 
plausibility of the assumption rather than to provide a self-sufficient argument for which I do not 
have space. My discussion will aim to relocate the problem of forgiveness, given these 
assumptions.  
Resentment should here be distinguished from anger or indignation, since anger is too broad a 
reaction and indignation need not be response to harm committed to the self but to moral wrongs 
merely witnessed (9). The victim may then choose to forgive the wrongdoer for the act and 
thereby attempt to resume the relationship, even if it will probably be different from what it was 
before the act. Forgiveness thus involves a decision to work against the resentment, at least by 
attempting to control the behavioural disposition that would normally have been the 
manifestation of such resentment, and by striving to suppress its deliberative priority. The 
resentment may well smoulder on, and to the extent that it does so, one may say that the victim 
has still not 'truly' forgiven. But this would be too much, especially since I do not want to get 
side-tracked into a debate about the status of such emotions – and their response to rational 
control – in our moral thinking. Finally, forgiveness, or rather, 'forgivingness' (Roberts's point), 
the disposition to forgive, is normally seen as a virtue, comprising moral demands that may not 
be satisfied by actions alone but which require certain motives and character traits. 
Mercy differs from forgiveness in two principal ways: the person in a position to bestow mercy 
by reducing just punishment for the wrongdoing (for example, a judge) need not have been 
personally wronged and thus need feel no resentment; and second, mercy requires a direct public 
manifestation, including being publicly accepted, whereas forgiveness, if genuine, will only 
involve an indirect manifestation of the change of heart through the victim's subsequent 
behaviour, and need not be accepted by the wrongdoer (one of Butler's points). One striking 
example of the distinction would be a victim who forgives her wrongdoer and yet who 
nevertheless demands merciless punishment for consequentialist reasons. 
Most importantly, forgiveness must be distinguished from condonation of or indifference to the 
wrong act (10). Condonation involves a clear awareness of the wrongness (i.e. a disapproval) of 
the act, but the deliberate refraining from any retributive response or public condemnation of it 
with the implied acquiescence in evil. Forgiveness is steadfast in seeing the act as wrong, and in 
continuing to condemn it as such, while at the same time being more interested in the agent and 
one's relationship with her: 
"Forgiveness is [...] the decision to see the wrongdoer in a new, more favourable light. 
Nor is this decision in any way a condonation of wrong. The forgiver never gives up her 
opposition to the wrongdoer's action, nor does she even give up her opposition to the 
wrongdoer's bad character traits. Instead, she revises her judgement of the person himself 
-- where the person is understood to be something other than or more than the character 
traits of which she does not approve." [Hampton (and Murphy) 1988, p. 84-5] 
This is perhaps the most difficult part of forgiveness as commonly understood, and involves a 
misleading simplification of the phenomenology. Somehow we are supposed to divorce the act 
from the agent, to see it as an aberration on an otherwise admirable character. Augustine's dictum 
to 'hate the sin, but love the sinner' -- the metaphor of sin as illness -- becomes more plausible 
when the wrongdoer, as part of the apologies and declared intention to repent that are often seen 
as necessary conditions to forgiveness (11), effectively invites the victim to a joint condemnation 
of the act. Without such apologies and intended repentance, it is argued (by e.g. Kolnai and 
Murphy), forgiveness becomes little more than timorous condonation of evil and the associated 
lack of self-respect: 
"a too ready tendency to forgive [...] may be sign that one lacks respect for oneself. [...] 
Not to have [...] the 'reactive attitude' of resentment when our rights are violated is to 
convey -- emotionally -- either that we do not think we have rights or that we do not take 
our rights very seriously. [...] To seek restoration [of relationships] at all cost -- even at 
the cost of one's very human dignity -- can hardly be a virtue. [...] If I count morally as 
much as anyone else (as I surely do), a failure to resent moral injuries done to me is a 
failure to care about the moral value incarnate in my own person [...] and this a failure to 
care bout the very rules of morality" (Murphy 1988, p. 17ff.) (12). 
In passing, the following asymmetry should be noted: I am assuming that the victim is able to 
recognise the wrongness of the act committed against her (and hence is worried about condoning 
it), while the wrongdoer, according to the Platonic claim above, is not fully aware of such 
wrongness. This is because of the place held by the act in the wrongdoer’s and the victim’s 
respective narrative self-understandings. The very intimacy of the wrongdoer’s agency requires 
psychological redescription if the act is to be committed at all by her, whereas the victim’s 
passivity means that her awareness of the wrongness becomes much more immediate and 
reliably objective: it is the victim’s projects and commitments that are disrupted by the act and 
that have to be adjusted with more or less difficulty to deal with such disruption. Again, I do not 
have space to argue for this as an independent claim beyond the reader’s indulgence, although I 
will add to it later on (13). 
Finally, two more cognate terms which will be relevant later on: reconciliation and exculpation. 
As Kolnai puts it (1973, p. 94), reconciliation "is likely to be largely based on forgiveness but it 
emphasises the result, not the essence, of forgiveness; and is a reciprocal return [...] to friendly 
relations, not a one-sided change of [...] attitude" (14). This is important because of its 
symmetry: both parties need to consider the relationship worth salvaging or resuming, even if the 
wrong was only committed 'one way'. As such, not only does the victim have to choose to 
forgive, but the wrongdoer has to choose to ask for forgiveness. Either party may refuse, the 
former because of the severity of the offence or the insufficient apology, the latter because she 
denies the victim's entitlement to resentment, or to such a degree of resentment. 
Exculpation, as its etymology suggests, is the discovery of sufficient justification or excuse to 
release the wrongdoer from guilt, at least in part. This is based on the legal paradigm, where 
excuses (e.g. insanity) and justification (e.g. self-defence) can be recognised as mitigating 
circumstances when ascribing a penalty. However, just as in law a just verdict will require taking 
the particular circumstances into account, so one cannot properly forgive an act of prima facie 
wrongdoing on the basis of excuses or justifications, since the act then ceases to be wrong and 
moves outside the scope of forgiveness. This is again Calhoun's argument, to which we shall be 
returning. In acknowledging excuses and justifications and thereby 'forgiving' the wrongdoer, we 
are doing no more than exculpating her, and giving her her due. Rather, forgiveness comes into 
play once all the exculpating factors have been taken into account and the act still found wrong. 
Haber (1991, p. 102) offers one interpretation to preserve the virtuous electivity of forgiveness 
while still maintaining the intelligibility of statements like 'you ought to forgive her'. In Haber's 
view, forgivingness is an imperfect virtue like charity. One is expected to be charitable some of 
the time and in some form, even if not here and now; one is liable to criticism for not being 
charitable enough or for being too charitable (e.g. at the expense of others who may have a valid 
claim to your attention and resources) over the long run. The disposition to be charitable does 
not generate any obligation once a set of necessary and sufficient conditions is met, nor does it 
rule out the demonstration of charity in the face of specifically prohibitive circumstances; an 
uncharitable person can perform acts of charity, and a charitable person can fail to do so. The 
'ought' in the above admonition is not a perfect 'ought' or even a supererogatory 'ought', but an 
'ought' that, if regularly and reliably unheeded over a lifetime, would be cause for censure (15). 
This is an important part of coming to see the process of forgiveness as extended, rather than as 
an isolated response to an isolated act of wrongdoing; as such it is much more dependent on 
character than on some idealised rationality. However, as I shall below, it is only half the story. 
What about the phenomenological aspect of such a virtue? There must surely be a more 
complicated thought process than merely aiming for statistical praiseworthiness over a lifetime; 
how does it affect the way I see the wrongdoer? The most obvious way, argues Haber, is in an 
increased willingness to give the benefit of the doubt when desert questions cannot be decisively 
answered for lack of circumstantial or motivational information, the victim simply does not 
know whether the wrong was serious enough to merit resentment (whatever her 'natural' reaction, 
which may well be over-dramatised), or whether the excuses offered or discovered were 
sufficient (in-itself or for-me), or whether the declared repentance will be subsequently borne out 
in deed (good intentions sabotaged by akrasia or unforeseeable temptations and obstacles). 
Calhoun I: aspirational forgiveness  
This essay has no intention to exhaustively survey the discussion of forgiveness in the recent 
literature, some of the main points of which I have adduced above. Rather, I will jump right into 
a more detailed examination of a rather atypical piece by Cheshire Calhoun, whose approach and 
conclusions I found initially very appealing. Calhoun agrees that we often speak of 'sufficient 
reasons' to forgive, of independent values to be promoted by forgiving, and Margrethe might 
well give Bohr such reasons to forgive Heisenberg, if not for the latter's repentance, than at least 
because of other facts or as a means to achieving other desirable goals (forgiveness as an 
essentially instrumental virtue). We are tempted to start one's deliberations with the question "Is 
there anything for the sake of which I ought to forgive even though I am clearly entitled to 
resentment?" (Calhoun 1992, p. 78). Calhoun accepts Haber's 'imperfect duty' interpretation: if I 
forgive for the sake of the cherished memory of a friendship, for example, then this is indeed 
more than is due, it is generous and charitable, therefore not perfectly obligatory. But 
importantly, argues Calhoun, the injury itself is unaddressed and ignored, and may therefore 
continue to threaten the friendship indirectly; and "because it is unaddressed, there is a real 
danger that efforts not to dwell on it will ultimately fail" (ibid.). Such forgiveness is only 
'minimalist'. This, however, is not what one would normally aspire to grant or obtain: 
'aspirational' forgiveness must involve the entire person, including the act of wrongdoing as an 
irreducible and unignorable manifestation of the wrongdoer's character. On this view, all freely-
willed acts will reveal something about their agent, and acts with more serious consequences to 
others will reveal more. To use the language of the Augustinian dictum, if the sin still remains 
after the excuses and justifications come in, and if the sinner was free and knew what she was 
doing, then the sin cannot be separated from the sinner. 
And Haber's 'benefit of the doubt' argument for electivity will not do: Calhoun rejects it by 
calling it elective "only in a weak sense" -- and such elective forgiveness again minimalist -- 
since it presupposes that if we had sufficient knowledge we would know what to do. No, says 
Calhoun, there is no room for doubt in aspirational forgiveness, and it can only concern the 
unrepentant: 
"Unlike minimalist forgiveness, the forgiveness we aspire to get (and give) is forgiveness 
for culpable, unrepentant, unpunished, and unrestituted wrongdoing whose existence is 
not dismissed by refusing to think about it. Or, more weakly stated, we want forgiveness 
for the culpability that remains after all excuses, justification, restitution and repentant 
reforms have been made and accepted -- a culpability that warrants our continuing to be 
resented. When I ask aspiringly for forgiveness, I ask you to forgive me for something 
that renders me undeserving and entitles you to hard feelings toward me" (Calhoun 1992, 
p. 80) (16). 
The key point about aspirational forgiveness is that I have moral choice, and choice of a specific 
kind (Calhoun 1992, p. 81). Under minimalist forgiving using Haber's benefit-based electivity, 
because of insufficient data or vague standards we must 'choose' whom to count as deserving. 
Under aspirational forgiveness, the choice is about how to respond to the decidedly undeserving.  
On the other side of Kolnai's paradox -- the threat of condonation and self-denigration -- Calhoun 
argues rightly that the situation is not conclusive; a refusal to forgive may show a hidebound 
rule-worship and a lack of magnanimity, while, in purely consequentialist terms it might indeed 
be forgiveness which is most likely to prevent future wrongdoing by the same agent or any 
witnesses. "As a point about human moral psychology, the idea that resentment, protest, and 
punishment best effect moral improvement is surely misguided. The last thing some need is yet 
more resentment and punishment" (Calhoun 1992, p. 85) (17). This is a narrower point than what 
I am discussing, however. What interests me is the moral phenomenology of the situation, and 
the irreducible distinctiveness of different cases, and the fundamental uncertainty that lies at the 
heart of such a phenomenology. 
Calhoun II: a narrative understanding of the wrongdoer 
So if the wrongdoing cannot be excused or justified away or jointly condemned for aspirational 
forgiveness, its residual wrongness must be faced squarely. But here Calhoun describes a further 
problem, that of making sense of a person freely choosing a wrong act. We are no longer afraid 
of condonation or self-denigration, but of losing intelligibility, which is what is ultimately so 
hurtful in trying to deal with a close friend's unexpected wrongdoing. Daniel Dennett, inspired 
by Strawson (1974) claims that: 
"our assumption that an entity is a person is shaken precisely in those cases where it 
matters: when wrong has been done and the question of responsibility arises. For in these 
cases the grounds for saying that the person is culpable (the evidence that he did wrong, 
was aware he was doing wrong, and did wrong of his own free will) are in themselves 
grounds for doubting that it is a person we are dealing with at all" (18). 
The first resentment, as a 'reactive attitude' (Strawson's term) of the agent for the act presupposed 
commission by a rational agent -- rather than, say, a volcano or a honeybee -- and the possibility 
of establishing or maintaining an interpersonal relationship with that person. But if we persist in 
believing the act to be wrong, we find ourselves adopting an 'objective attitude' (again, 
Strawson's term) to the agent, beginning to lose our resentment and see her as a case of treatment 
and social policy. However, argues Calhoun, the presupposition of general personhood, guided 
by rational and moral principles as we are, does not go far enough; it stops short of the 
specificity of the act and of the particular person's life into which it fits. So while the agent's 
metaphysical personal status is threatened by an increasing awareness of the willed wrongness of 
the act, the integrity of the agent's particular biography need not be, especially since the act play 
quite a different role -- and no less fundamental a role -- in that biography. And it is in this 
context that the act can and must make sense. I quote Calhoun at length: 
"Normal persons also live through time, serially confronting different configurations of 
events, obstacles, unasked-for responsibilities, internal needs and motivations, others' 
sometimes irrational demands and needs, etc. In living through time, normal persons need 
to make the sorts of choices that will add up to and sustain an integrated, rather than 
fragmented, biography. They need their actions to make sense within, or to make sense 
of, their past and projected future lives. What I will suggest is that aspirational 
forgiveness is achieved by seeing that, although an agent's wrongdoing fails to make 
moral sense, it does make biographical sense. I will also suggest that a commitment to 
going beyond a merely minimalist forgiveness is also a commitment to deprioritising the 
moral and to seeing that there may be equally important ways that normal persons of 
good will need to make sense of their lives" (p. 92) (19). 
Note that this process is "sufficiently burdensome that it would be unreasonable to require that 
we do this for everyone" (p. 95). But at the same time we jeopardise their status in our eyes as 
persons. Here, says Calhoun, we have to make the radical choice of whether or not to forgive, 
with all the difficulties that this entails for the future, or to "disengage, removing ourselves from 
harm's way." As such our relationship with the agent involves continuous discovery. With minor 
slights, we may ignore them and merely add that behavioural disposition to our stock of 
inductive knowledge of that person, in parallel to the process of discovering what aspects of our 
behaviour irritate others. With more serious shortcomings, the sort that will be inevitable in even 
the most harmonious relationships, the limit is approached where the Heisenberg, if he is to be 
entirely frank (or if Bohr is to be entirely frank with himself in Heisenberg's absence), can only 
say to Bohr: "this is simply what I do; I know it bothers you but I cannot guarantee that it will 
not happen again. You must decide whether to accept me -- and if necessary forgive me -- for 
being the sort of person I am." 
Criticism of Calhoun 
Calhoun’s approach and conclusions are very appealing, but if I have understood him correctly 
he is vulnerable to three main criticisms which will occupy us for the remainder of this paper. 
Rather than a setp-by-step attack of Calhoun’s argumentation, however, these three criticisms 
represent problems for any account of forgiveness, and so Calhoun’s piece is more of a 
springboard to provide a distinctive framework for understanding these problems. As such, my 
aim is not to refute Calhoun in order to provide a better explanation of the same phenomena, but 
rather to relocate the problem away from the questions at the centre of Calhoun’s and others’ 
interest, and to expose the essential limitations of philosophical enquiry in coming to grips with 
the concept of forgiveness. The three problems may be called the problem of relevant timeframe; 
the threat of radical subjectivism; and the ineliminable uncertainty of motive. 
 (i) the relevant timeframe 
Like other writers, both Kolnai and Calhoun see forgiveness as primarily an act based on a 
decision in response to another act, in other words, as a process confined to a small slice of time. 
This is certainly the case for a large class of acts of forgiveness. However, I would argue that all 
such instances can only be minimalist, and therefore not the sort that should be of interest to 
Calhoun; real aspirational forgiveness is a process rather than an act, and takes time, perhaps 
months or years, and it will often be difficult to mark a completion date or even a steady 
progression. One aspect of this process will be a decline in resentment, but again, this will be 
hard to measure subjectively since certain events could trigger a smouldering, obscure 
resentment to burst into flame. 
"The decision to forgive is normally only the beginning of a process of forgiveness that 
may take a considerable time to complete. Indeed there are cases in which it is never 
completed even though one is committed to completing it once the decision to forgive has 
been made. [...] the process of forgiveness is not completed until one has entirely rid 
oneself of the sense of injury. But it cannot be carried to fruition immediately by some 
act of will" (Horsbrugh 1974, p. 271). 
I can imagine that most people go to their deathbed with a whole string of past relationships that 
included injurious acts and attitudes that have never been properly forgiven -- even though the 
relationship has continued and developed. And this fact works both ways -- we on our deathbeds 
may never be aware of the full scale of hurt that we have clumsily foisted on others, or of their 
efforts to forgive us while adapting the relationship. Calhoun is right to suggest that the starting 
point for aspirational forgiveness is the effort to understand the significance of the act in the 
other person's narrative history and in her own attempts at making sense of their lives; by he 
underestimates just how complicated this can be, how vague this can be, and how long it can 
take. 
And often the relationship between the original wrongdoer and victim will itself continue to 
evolve, hindering the possibility of the sort of accurate observations Calhoun thinks would be 
required to justify any decisions about whether to forgive. Even when the relationship has been 
broken off, when the wrongdoer is dead or estranged, one's own memories of both the injurious 
act or attitude, as well as its context, one's knowledge of the wrongdoer at the time etc. are all 
subject to change. Indeed, so much depends on the other relationships and projects in which the 
wrongdoer and victim find themselves at the time, that one party may simply not feel the need to 
repent, or the other party to forgive. As such, considerations about the value of the relationship 
(and therefore about the effort one could justify in trying to preserve it) will differ when either 
side is thinking about whether and how best to apologise or forgive respectively. 
 (ii) the threat of radical subjectivism 
It is hard to tell whether Calhoun intends his conclusions to be taken seriously as a 
counterbalance to other types of discussion or as a replacement. If the latter, he threatens to 
throw the moral baby out with the minimalist bathwater. When we make negative moral 
judgements about somebody's actions, we presuppose that there is a point to expressing such 
judgements. Calhoun seems to be flirting with a radical subjectivism that would sacrifice the 
possibility of justified censure to a highly contingent compatibility between different concrete 
personalities with less than perfect knowledge of each other. It is hard to imagine any friendship 
lasting long enough for real intimacy to develop when one can effectively say "like it or lump it" 
as if all preferences had been settled once and for all. 
And while scepticism about finding a general conclusion to cover all cases might be in order, 
looking for a quasi-objective narrative context may also be wishful thinking; first, there are 
doubts about how much one can ever know another human being. Younger people have simpler 
views of the world and fewer defining experiences, which might suggest they are easier to get to 
know. On the other hand, their preferences and self-understandings are far from settled, and so 
any knowledge of them has to struggle to keep up with the changes, some of which will result 
from your knowledge. Part of the way that a young person finds her way around the world is to 
bump into things. Moral principles are first learned as restraints without further explanations, and 
one important manifestation of such principles is the censure of close friends. 
Older people tend to have more settled preferences, but have hidden depths that can never be 
properly fathomed. In such a case it really should be a question of giving the benefit of the doubt, 
which, pace Calhoun, does not presuppose greater certainty of what to do were one 
hypothetically to have sufficiently intimate knowledge. For such intimacy is impossible. But 
every individual is older and younger in different ways, and therefore requires corrective censure 
and the benefit of the doubt in different contexts in order to grow and for the relationship in 
question to develop. The act and the alleged harm will appear quite different to different agents 
of different ages, in terms of fitting -- comfortably or not -- into her remembered biographical 
network of choices, her character as formed by these choices and situational luck, and her long 
and short-term intentions at the moment of committing the act. In the same way, then, excuses 
and justifications may look quite different to the agent. And she might find herself unable to 
accept the 'objective' account which the observer is throwing at her. But this is not in itself a 
reason to refrain from throwing the objective account at her. 
This is probably unfair to demand of Calhoun, since a comprehensive account of the limits to 
subjectivism would be too large and convoluted to be of much use. Nevertheless, it will remain a 
constant point of vulnerability in any particularist justification. Particularly in Heisenberg's case, 
where we know that certain historical deeds to which he lent his indirect support strike most as 
truly unforgivable. 
 (iii) The irreducible and ineliminable uncertainty of motive 
The second criticism represented a set of forces that threaten to pull Calhoun's account apart. 
This third criticism would threaten to dissolve it. He seems to assume that every act, if it does not 
make moral sense and if it threatens our presupposition in the agent's essential personhood, must 
therefore make biographical sense as a regulative ideal of self-refection (i.e. rather than a source 
of action). And this seems plausible. It was a particular person who generated the act, they did so 
freely, knowingly, and deliberately, and in their right mind, and so they must have had their own 
reasons. If such reasons cannot be ascertained even within a relationship of great intimacy, the 
story goes, they must nevertheless be assumed to be there. The wrong act, for example, might 
have been a lesser evil within a context that allowed only a limited number of viable options to 
be conceived by an agent with a distinctive way of understanding the world and the viable 
options within it. Calhoun might argue that any alternative conception would again threaten 
either the agent-person's moral responsibility for the act, or the agent's status as a person. 
However, as always, the truth probably lies somewhere in the middle. For Calhoun's analysis is 
an extension of a conceptual framework into which everything is designed to fit, a framework 
based on what Williams (1995, p. 221) calls two "metaphysically special units": an action and an 
agent, linked by an unmediated relationship, which together generated a certain "purified 
conception of blame," based on the "seeming requirement of justice that the agent should be 
blamed for no more and no less than what was in his power." And the justification of blame -- in 
accordance with this purified conception of the conditions for blame -- also yields conditions for 
considering forgiveness as an option. And yet, the agent chooses (and will may be liable to 
blame) and is not herself entirely sure why she chooses. In saying this I am not simply shifting 
the assumption of intelligibility one stage into the subconscious, where all sorts of childhood 
traumas await to explain each and every deed. Rather, I am suggesting a certain amount of 
irreducible uncertainty at the core of every person, an uncertainty whose nature will be different 
from person to person and from case to case: different gaps, different causal strings, different 
ultimate ends. When a given action, blameworthy under Williams's pure conception, becomes 
serious enough to distort or destroy a hitherto intimate relationship, then the chances are that it 
concerns something so fundamental that no intelligibility can be found, even in good faith, by the 
agent or a knowledgeable observer. 
It is for this reason that every wise person will acknowledge a need for censure from what they 
consider as better-placed observers. Calhoun's aspirational forgiveness means that "one stops 
demanding that the person be different from what she is. [...] One may still put the person on 
moral trial and find her wanting. But aspirational forgiveness is the choice not to demand that 
she improve. It is the choice to place respecting another's way of making sense of her life before 
resentfully enforcing moral standards." (Calhoun 1992, p. 95). This is certainly part of the truth, 
but Calhoun seems to imply that every person has a successful and comprehensive way of 
'making sense of their life' and that this should be respected. I would argue, however, that some 
attempts at making sense are merely a stab in the dark, and that the person concerned for her 
integrity will welcome censure in those areas where she is simply uncertain. 
The most typical example of this fundamental uncertainty are decisions of great import that have 
to be made quickly, and where the consequences have to be embraced because of the associated 
impossibility of openly adhering to the principles one was forced to reject. As Frayn's 
Heisenberg puts it: "decisions make themselves when you're coming downhill at seventy 
kilometres an hour," which is shortly after he tells Bohr: "I always knew you'd be picking your 
way step by step down the slope behind me, digging all the capsized meanings and implications 
out of the snow" (Frayn 1998, p. 25). And this often means guessing at the narrative, often by 
forcing square pegs into round holes, a narrative that Calhoun is asking us to respect. 
Rationalisation is the name of the beast; I quote from Frayn's play again, where Bohr's wife 
Margrethe attacks Heisenberg for trying to rationalise what she sees as baser ambition: 
"When you tell the story, yes, it all falls into place, it all has a beginning and a middle 
and an end. But I was there, and when I remember what it was like I'm there still, and I 
look around me and what I see isn't a story! It's confusion and rage and jealousy and tears 
and no one knowing what things mean or which way they're going to go." (Frayn 1998, p. 
75) 
And this is the reason, suggests Frayn, for Heisenberg's mysterious visit to Copenhagen in 1941. 
He found himself unable to integrate his continuing support for Nazi Germany into his partly 
contrived narrative understanding of who is was, and he was going to see Bohr, not for 
forgiveness or for condemnation, but for help in putting it all together as an intelligible 
background against which to make meaningful future choices. 
Heisenberg: All at once the clear purposes inside my head lose all definite shape. The 
light falls on them and they scatter [...] 
Bohr: There's something about himself that he doesn't know. Something he sees for an 
instant out of the corner of his eye, that vanishes every time he turns to look. [Frayn 
1998, p. 90-91] 
In the postscript to the play, Frayn discusses the attempts by biographers to come to grips with 
Heisenberg's elusive personality. To this end they were unsure how much to take of Heisenberg's 
own explanations for his past actions, since they sensed lingering uncertainty about why he had 
made some controversial choices. "But," argues Frayn, 
"the uncertainty surely begins long before the point where Heisenberg might have offered 
an explanation. He was under at least as many contradictory pressures at the time to 
shape the actions he later failed to explain, and the uncertainty would still have existed, 
for us and for him, even if he had been as open, honest, and helpful as it is humanly 
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(1) I would like to thank Carolyn Wilde at the University of Bristol, UK, for her suggestions 
to a much earlier draft of this paper, as well as Pierpaolo Marrone of the Università di Trieste in 
Italy and two anonymous reviewers whose insightful commentary I have tried to accommodate. 
back 
(2) The central conceit of Frayn's play was to compare the systemic uncertainty at the root of 
atomic physics (to the principle of which Heisenberg gave his name) to a similar uncertainty at 
the root of human knowledge of oneself and others. back 
(3) As Murphy argued (1988), Jesus on the cross should have said "Father, excuse them, for 
they now not what they do." As an anticipation of my argument, let me mention here that an act 
can be committed in this sort of ignorance, and then excused. However, an act can also be 
committed, without being quite certain why, such that later, reasons can be ascribed to it in an 
effort to fit it into the agent's narrative understanding of herself. back 
(4) In speaking of the 'point', I want to highlight the first impulse of searching for appropriate 
ends. Later, however, I will reject this narrow instrumental reasoning and advocate the possible 
intrinsic value of forgiveness. back 
(5) One could also imagine a relevant status as fellow-End in Kant's Kingdom, fellow-
member of the biological species etc. back 
(6) This is the view of one of my two anonymous reviewers. See n. 1. back 
(7) See Bernard Williams’s seminal discussion in Smart, J. and Williams, B. Utilitarianism: 
For and Against, OUP 1973. back 
(8) In what follows, I have made use of Murphy, J. 'Forgiveness and Mercy' in Craig, J. 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Routledge 1998. back 
(9) Roberts (1995, p. 291) argues that 'resentment' is too brooding, too passive to capture the 
typical reaction to injury. Above all, God is more likely to be angry than resentful. I shall stick to 
resentment for the same reason that Peter Strawson does, that it presupposes a person being 
resented (see discussion below), whereas anger is too undirected. back 
(10) Other cognate terms would include remission, absolution and atonement, which tend to 
be restricted to religious discourse and are therefore outside the scope of this paper. back 
(11) See e.g. Kolnai 1973, Murphy (and Hampton) 1988, p. 24 and Roberts 1995. The subject 
of what constitutes adequate repentance is itself complex, involving a change of heart and a new 
understanding of oneself, the act and the victim that parallels that comprising forgiveness. Much 
of what I have to say in this paper could be used to develop an analysis of repentance, although I 
shall not have space here. back 
(12) McNaughton (1999) emphasises that forgiveness doled out too lightly may also clash 
with other duties to the community when the wrongdoing in question (bombing in Northern 
Ireland) is directed against the community as a whole: 
"Does it put others (those unable or unwilling to forgive) in a poor light, indeed a disloyal 
act at a moment when common suffering and condemnation should be the priority? Might 
it not undermine the position of those committed to fighting against the common evil?" 
back 
(13) I am grateful to one of my two anonymous reviewers for highlighting this point. See n. 1. 
back 
(14) Roberts (1995, p. 293) writes that forgiveness essentially "aims at reconciliation." Clearly 
such reconciliation will be impossible in the event of an estranged or dead wrongdoer. back 
(15) This retributive, unforgiving attitude is well characterised by Martha Nussbaum: "she 
who notes and reacts to every injustice, and who is preoccupied with assigning just punishments 
becomes oddly similar to those against whom she reacts. Retributive anger hardens the spirit, 
turning it against the humanity it sees." Nussbaum, M. 'Equity and mercy' in: Simmons, Cohen, 
Cohen and Beitz (eds.) Punishment, Princeton UP 1995, p. 163. back 
(16) Calhoun raises an interesting point about the symmetry of forgiveness, i.e. that both 
wrongdoer and victim crave the same type of forgiveness. This relates to a later point I shall 
make about the both parties considering a relationship worth saving after a wrong, so that one 
asks for and the other gives forgiveness. back 
(17) Hampton (and Murphy) (1988) offers a more comprehensive discussion of forgiveness 
within the framework of punitive justice. back 
(18) Dennett, D. 'Conditions of Personhood' in: Rorty A. (ed.) Identities of Persons, U of Cal 
Press 1976), quoted in Calhoun 1992, p. 89. back 
(19) The impetus for the 'deprioritising' of the moral is clearly Bernard Williams. See his 
'Ethics, Character and Morality' in: Moral Luck, CUP 1981, and his Ethics and the Limits of 
Philosophy, Harvard UP 1985. back 
